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Abstract
This paper explores the effects of virtual development
on product quality, from the viewpoint of "conformance
to specifications". Specifically, causes of defect injection
and non- or late-detection are explored. Because of the
practical difficulties of obtaining hard project-specific
defect data, an approach was taken that relied upon
accumulated expert knowledge. The accumulated expert
knowledge based approach was found to be a practical
alternative to an in-depth defect causal analysis on a
per-project basis. Defect injection causes seem to be
concentrated in the Requirements Specification phases.
Defect dispersion is likely to increase, as requirements
specifications are input for derived requirements speci-
fications in multiple, related sub-projects. Similarly, a
concentration of causes for the non- or late detection of
defects was found in the Integration Test phases. Virtual
development increases the likelihood of defects in the
end product because of the increased likelihood of defect
dispersion, because of new virtual development related
defect  causes, and because causes already existing in
co-located development are more likely to occur.
Keywords: Virtual development, Product Quality,
Defect injection, Defect detection, Defect Causal
Analysis
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to investigate the
possible effects of virtual development on the quality of
the delivered product, in particular the exploration of
defect causes. Virtual development is the development of
a product (or product family) by a virtual team. A virtual
team is a team distributed across space, time, and
organization boundaries, and linked by webs of
interactive technology [13]. We prefer the term “virtual
development” over the term “global software
development” as used by Karolak [12], Carmel [3] and
Herbsleb et al. [9], because the scope of development is
not necessarily restricted to software only, and because
the development team need not necessarily be scattered
around the globe. Being in another building or on a
different floor of the same building, or even at the other
end of a corridor, can be  sufficient to label it as global
development [9].
Both Karolak and Carmel describe the issues that
cause virtual development of products to be much more
complex than even the most complex project managed
entirely in house [3, 12]. They also suggest possible
solution strategies, derived from case studies in virtual
development projects. The works of Karolak and Carmel
are focused on the managerial and collaboration aspects
of the organization and execution of virtual development
projects. The emphasis is on timely delivery of the
product within budget. In this paper, we address the
effects  of virtual development on product quality, as this
is not or only marginally addressed in frequently cited
literature on virtual development, e.g. [3, 9, 12].
However, product quality is a complex and multi-faceted
concept, pointed out already in 1982 by Garvin [6]. He
identified five different views of quality: the
transcendental view, the manufacturing view, the
product view, the user's view, and the value-for-money
view. In the context of this paper, we will consider the
manufacturing view, usually encapsulated in the phrase
“conformance to specification”, as our base view on
product quality. Non-conformances to specifications
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2(which we shall call defects) will typically have a
negative impact on product quality whatever the point of
view.  
Section 2 introduces virtual development and its
specific problems. It leads to the recognition of four risk
categories that, given the unique aspects of virtual
development, are crucial to success or failure of virtual
development projects. Section 3 reports on an
explorative investigation into the effects of virtual
development on product quality. Practical problems to
get hard defect data forced an approach relying upon
accumulated expert knowledge concerning defect causes
in virtual development projects. In "Defect Causal
Analysis"-like meetings a team of experts took a
lifecycle-centric view on virtual development to address
typical causes of the injection and non- or late-detection
of defects. Section 4 discusses the suitability of the
alternative approach and the findings of the explorative
investigation. Finally, section 4 summarizes the
conclusions.
2 Problem Areas of Virtual Development
To investigate the effects of virtual development on
product quality,  the associated problems and risks as
reported by Carmel [3] and Karolak [12] can be used as
a  point of departure. Carmel performed a case study, the
Globally Dispersed Software Development (GDSD)
study, to find the aspects in which global development
differs from traditional, entirely in-house development
[3]. The GDSD study concerned 17 software companies
engaged in virtual development of products. Eventually,
Carmel recognises the following three unique aspects:
Distance between development sites has a direct
impact on project control, coordination and
communication
Time zone differences between development sites
make it even harder to communicate, impacting project
control and coordination
Cultural differences between development sites may
lead to mistrust, mis-communication and lack of
cohesion.
On the basis of these findings, Carmel identified five
problem areas that act as “centrifugal forces, driving the
global development team apart”.  We interpret Carmel’s
statement of problem areas that are “driving the global
development team apart” as problem areas that
potentially threaten the delivery of the product in time,
within budget and with the specified or implicitly
expected product quality. The problem areas that Carmel
recognized are:
(1) geographic dispersion, (2) control and
coordination breakdown, (3) loss of communication
richness, (4) loss of “teamness” and (5) cultural
differences.
We interpret Carmel’s unique aspects as causes and
the problems as their effects. In this view, the problem
area “Geographic dispersion” seems peculiar, as it is a
direct implication of the “distance” aspect. Hammar et
al. also came to the same conclusion [8]. These authors
replaced the problem area “Geographic dispersion” by
“Differences in knowledge”, that they consider to be an
effect caused by Carmel’s unique aspects Distance and
Culture. However, distance or cultural differences do not
necessarily cause differences in knowledge.
Karolak’s work [12] has a lot in common with that of
Carmel [3]. However, Karolak uses the word “risk”
where Carmel uses the word  “problem” (or problem
area). We prefer the term “risk”, because it implies that
the issue it addresses might be a problem, not that it
necessarily is a problem.
Karolak distinguishes three risk categories:
Organizational risks, concerning decision authorities,
responsibilities, tasks and project structure, impacting
project control, coordination and team behavior,
Technical risks, concerning methods and tools used
to solve technical problems, impacting development
methodology, architectural choices and eventually
product quality,
Communication risks, that may lead to mistrust,
misinterpretations and inadequate communications.
Although Karolak and Carmel view virtual or global
development from a different perspective, they both
arrive at more or less the same risks or problem areas.
Nevertheless, to study the effects of virtual development
on product quality, we favor Karalok's risk view,
because we consider the risk categories more
implication-neutral and coherent.
In one aspect Karolak and Carmel differ markedly:
where Karolak considers technical aspects as a potential
risk, Carmel seems to consider them as a solution. A
possible explanation of these seemingly opposed views
may be found in a study by Maidantchik et al. [14]. They
report the experiences of managing a global
development project, in which advanced technology was
used to minimize, or even eliminate some of the risks.
The collaborating groups that together formed the virtual
development team differed in process maturity levels (as
measured by CMM). They realized that for low maturity
organizations it might be difficult or even impossible to
introduce advanced methods and technology. For
organizations with a higher level of process maturity,
advanced methods and technology can be a solution,
while for low maturity organizations the same methods
and technology can be a problem. The study by
Maidantchik et al. identifies the differences between
software processes used by collaborating groups and
associated process maturities as a risk category for
virtual development projects [14]. Earlier, McMahon
already warned for the potential danger of differences in
processes and process maturities of collaborating parties
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3in distributed development [16]. The observations of
these authors are in line with our own experiences in
virtual development. Consequently, we consider process
risks as an additional risk category for virtual
development.
Karolak’s risk categories apply to both virtual and
co-located projects. However, the likelihood of risks
occurring in virtual development projects is greater [12],
due to the three unique aspects of virtual development as
identified by Carmel [3]. This is equally so for the
additional process risk category.
In first instance, we wanted to investigate in-depth
the causes of defects in a number of virtual development
projects. However, early in the preparation stage of the
investigation it became apparent that such an approach
was unfeasible:  either the necessary defect data for
determining defect root causes is  unavailable, or
organizations refuse to provide them. A similar
observation has been reported by Chulani [5]. Moreover,
a quick scan learned that organizations limit the extent of
defect classification and analysis to only collect defect
data for solving problems at hand; root cause analysis to
eventually prevent defects from recurring in the future is
hardly practiced.  If applied at all, defect classification
schemes like the Hewlett Packard Scheme [7], the IEEE
1044 Standard Classification for Software Anomalies
[10] or Orthogonal Defect Classification [4] are rarely
employed on such a scale that their scope includes the
entire virtual development context (i.e. the entire set of
related projects contributing to the development of the
product).
These practical problems forced us to explore an
approach to our investigation of defects, alternative to
that of an in-depth causal analysis on a per-project basis.
The problem of lack of hard data was also faced by
Briand et al., albeit in a different context [1]. They
successfully investigated the cost-effectiveness of
inspections by relying upon expert judgments. Likewise,
our alternative approach is based upon accumulated
expert knowledge concerning defect causes in virtual
development projects.
3 An Exploratory Investigation of Defect
Causes
3.1 Investigation Goals
Apart from the goal of determining the suitability of
the approach, this exploratory investigation aims at
answering the research questions:
1. What are typical causes for the injection of
defects in virtual development? These may
either be (a) ‘new’ causes, i.e. additional to
causes already present in co-located
development, or (b) causes also present in co-
located development but with a much higher
probability of occurrence in a virtual
development context.
2. What are typical causes for non- or late-
detection of defects in virtual development? I.e.
why is it that defects are not detected at all or
late?
We use the word defect here, as a generic term for
any discrepancy between:
- product information specifying the product's
behavior and the behavior requested by the
product development principal
- actual product behavior and the specification of
its behavior
- information intended for the verification  &
validation of the product  and its specified and
requested behavior.
3.2 Investigation Approach
Outline.   Six analysis meetings, with selected experts as
participants, were conducted to identify causes for defect
injection and non- or late-detection. The meetings very
much resembled the causal analysis meetings as seen in
the Defect Causal Analysis (DCA) process [2] and
Defect Prevention Process (DPP) [15]. A major
difference was the way in which defects to be analyzed
were gathered, as shown in figure 1. Instead of selecting
a sample from a project’s problem database as in regular
DCA, an inventory was made of defect types and
associated causes on basis of the accumulated experience
of the participating experts.
Figure 1. Context of the Causal Analysis Meeting:
Standard DCA (left) vs. this investigation (right).
Selection of participants. Participants in the analysis
meetings were carefully selected on the basis of their
professional background and expertise. Each participant
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4had to have over three years of experience in the area of
virtual development.
They had to be directly involved in product testing,
technical product support, defect causal analysis or
project management. Of these areas, defect causal
analysis experience was a prerequisite for participation.
An additional criterion was that they had been directly
involved in multiple virtual development projects in the
last two years. To ensure a sufficiently wide experience
base, we have set the minimum number of experts to
five. Actually, six experts participated. The selected
experts, all at senior level, included two test managers,
one test architect, one software architect, one project
manager and one service engineer. They had all acquired
experience in multiple organizations, and so
correspondingly their accumulated knowledge about
defect causes covered multiple organizations.
Moderatorship.  A moderator chaired and guided the
analysis meetings. His tasks included introducing the
meeting participants to the purpose and set-up of the
meeting. To safeguard the duration of the meetings, he
also intervened in discussions preventing them getting
too extensive. At the end of a meeting, the moderator
evaluated the meeting.
Meeting and analysis process.  In each meeting, a
lifecycle-centric view on product creation was taken. A
lifecycle-centric view was reported valuable for the
investigation of the effects of virtual development on
product quality: virtual development projects are
typically structured as a hierarchy of lifecycles,
reflecting the decomposition of projects into sub-projects
[17]. An example of a generic V-lifecycle, deployed in a
virtual development setting is given in figure 2.
Figure 2. Generic V-lifecycle as deployed in a typical
virtual development context.
For each lifecycle phase, the participants discussed
about typical defects arising in that specific phase,
adversely affecting product quality. Subsequently,
possible causes were identified for those defects of
which there was a substantiated opinion that their
injection (or non-detection) is significantly influenced by
the nature of the project (i.e. in a virtual development
context). Identification of causes was supported by
brainstorming about what possibly could go wrong in the
area of communication, process, organization and
technology (i.e. the risk categories). Substantiation was
to be provided either by statements found in literature on
defect detection and prevention or by the participants’
own experiences gained from the outcomes of defect
causal analyses in earlier projects. By using the cause-
effect graphing technique [11], the participants tried to
systematically identify all possible causes for injection
and non-detection. Causes were assigned to one of the
risk categories: communication, process, organization or
technology. Only in case of irresolvable doubts, it was
allowed to assign the cause to multiple risk categories.
To ensure focus and attention from the participants, the
duration of the meetings was limited to a maximum of
three hours.  Six analysis meetings were held, each with
a different combination of the six experts. The number of
participants in a meeting was deliberately kept small, as
to avoid negative group effects like cognitive inertia,
dominations and production blocking [18]. Each meeting
built upon the results obtained in previous meetings. In
this way, the collection of causes was gradually
reviewed, refined and inter-subjectively extended. At the
end of a meeting, an evaluation was held in which the
experts were invited to give their opinion about the
analysis process and how they perceived the results.
3.3 Investigation Results
Figure 3 and 4 show examples of the cause-effect
graphing performed during the causal analysis meetings.
Figure 3 is an analysis example of defect injection
showing causes for the injection of specification defects
(e.g. wrong, missing, unclear). Figure 4 is an analysis
example of non-detection and lists causes for defects not
being detected at system testing. For illustrative purposes
the cause-effect graphs have been simplified.
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5Figure 3. Example of a fish-bone diagram showing
causes for injection of specification defects.
Figure 4. Example of fish-bone diagram showing
causes for non- or late-detection at system testing.
A summary of the analysis results for the injection of
defects is given in Appendix 1, answering research
question 1: What are typical causes for the injection of
defects in virtual development? The rows represent the
various lifecycle phases given in Figure 2, while the
columns represent the risk categories. Each table cell
contains potential causes for the injection of defects
during the corresponding lifecycle phase.
The table given in Appendix 2 has a similar
construction as the table given in Appendix 1, but here
the cells contain causes for non- or late-detection of
defects during the corresponding lifecycle phase. It
contains answers to research question 2: What are
typical causes for non-  or late detection of defects in
virtual  development? Note that the same cause can
appear in multiple cells. However, the cause is mostly
only mentioned in the cell where it was found to be most
significant (i.e. present in practice). Also note explicitly
that causes that would be appearing in co-located
development as well are left out. Causes like these are
only mentioned if their likelihood of occurrence was
considered to be higher in a virtual development context
than in a co-located development context.
4 Discussion
4.1 Discussion of the approach
The alternative approach yielded tangible
information about defect causes in virtual developments.
The evaluations, held at the end of each analysis
meeting, learned that the participating experts considered
the results representative for defect causes in virtual
development projects. In later meetings, experts
recognized and confirmed the causes that had been
identified in previous meetings by different experts,
without any exception.
An issue discussed was whether people can retrieve
information easily and reliably from long term memory.
The prevailing opinion was that the systematic lifecycle-
based brainstorming, the extended cause-effect
reasoning, the usage of risk categories and the
interaction of participants with different viewpoints
effectively stimulated the retrieval of long-term memory
information. Participants independently expressed their
confidence in the completeness of the results. We
conclude that determination of defect causes based upon
accumulated expert knowledge can be considered as a
practical and valid alternative to an in-depth defect
causal analysis on a per-project basis.
Future application of this approach may benefit from
the following observations:
Participants Involvement. Overall, the participating
experts exhibited great interest in the investigation and
were highly motivated to take part in the analysis
meetings. The opportunity to brainstorm in-depth about
the root causes of defects was perceived as a strong
motivator: in actual projects there is hardly any
possibility to do so, because of time and cost constraints.
Some of the experts also mentioned that the discussions
with fellow-participants contributed favorably to their
understanding of the problems encountered in virtual
development. All expressed the interest in receiving a
copy of the final investigation report.
Role of the Moderator.  Strong moderatorship was
needed to ensure focus in the analysis meetings.
Participants tended to continue discussing issues
deviating from the analysis goals. A recurrent issue
SPECIFICATION
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Bad traceability
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over projects
No change control
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Changes in
requirements not
communicated to
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not communicated to
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Different interpretation of
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Delayed
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expertise of other
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DETECTED AT
SYSTEM TESTING
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projects
Unjust reuse
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projects
Changes in test object
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No stakeholder
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Locally insufficient
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domain knowledge
Unjust trust in
test effectiveness of
other project's staff
Responsibilities not
assigned
Inadequate test
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Bad duplicate of test
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Hiding policy
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Different interpretation
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Unjust trust in pretesting by
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6concerned the division of defect-finding responsibilities
between developers and testers. Another issue tending to
extensive discussions was the question of whether
certain defect types can be detected at all in a specific
lifecycle phase.
Cause-Effect Graphing.  Cause-effect graphing was
found to be a useful tool for experienced based root-
cause determination. However, cause-effect graphing
turned out to be a laborious process, because of the
length and inter-relation of the cause-effect chains. A
cause can be the effect of another cause (or a
combination of other causes). Eventually, a root cause
might be a complex interaction of elements pertaining to
one or more of the risk categories. This makes the
assignment of a cause to one single risk category at least
disputable. Either objective discrimination criteria are
needed for assigning a cause to a single risk category, or
it should be clearly allowed to assign causes to multiple
risk categories.
4.2 Discussion of the results
Injection of defects.   Previously, Van Moll et al. [17]
reported a case study indicating that transitions between
lifecycles of sub-projects are particularly sensitive to
defect injection. While their study focused on the
locations of defect injections, the current study explores
the causes of defect injections at the transitions. The data
from the current investigation amplifies the finding that
the transitions between lifecycles of sub-projects from
virtual development projects are defect sensitive. The
table in Appendix 1 shows a concentration of causes in
the Technical Requirements Specification and
Integration Test phase (of system project X). The
Technical Requirements Specification shows a relatively
high number of causes, and may inherently be more
sensitive to injection than other phases. As in this phase,
information is being processed that has been transferred
from one context (that of Project X) to another context
(that of Project Y), the phase is said to be situated at a
transition between lifecycles. A relatively high number
of potential causes increases the likelihood of defects
being injected at such lifecycle transitions.
Defect injection occurring in the Technical
Requirements Specification phase can be considered
severe as in an actual virtual development project, a
given Requirements Specification is a source for derived
Requirements Specifications to multiple sub-projects.
This means that defects are likely to disperse in a virtual
development context.
Regardless of the project context (i.e. virtual or co-
located), defects are typically injected in either
requirements, design or implementation phases. In
virtual development, no new types of defects (i.e.
exclusively occurring in virtual development context) are
to be expected. Rather, virtual development increases the
likelihood of defect injection because new defect causes
occur and causes already existing in co-located
development are more likely. Consequently, dispersion
of defects as well as an increased likelihood of injection
may lead to a higher number of defects in the delivered
product.
Defect injection is significantly increased in
situations where changes in the requirements, design or
implementation are being handled. Proper handling
includes change control authority, impact analysis and
the communication of changes. It was observed that a
multitude of causes relates to the handling of changes.
An example is that changes are not, or not clearly
communicated to the appropriate parties involved or are
not unanimously agreed upon. While non-adequate
handling of changes is already severe in co-located
development, virtual development projects even seem to
aggravate the effects, resulting in additional defect
injection causes.
Non-detection or late-detection of defects. Causes of
non- or late-detection are concentrated in the Integration
Test phase of the system-level project (project X). At
this lifecycle transition, the components developed in the
sub-projects are integrated and subsequently tested.
Dispersed defects (especially from the Requirements
Phase transitions) will become painfully visible here.
Appendix 2 shows that defects that should have been
found earlier, are causing integration difficulties and
project delays. Lacking or insufficient test coordination
(over the entire virtual development project) seems to be
the major cause of non or late-detection of defects.
Project delays threaten the execution of a proper
integration test. Projects tend to rely upon the subsequent
system test as a fall-back, not or insufficiently realizing
that certain types of integration related defects cannot be
detected at this later phase.
The danger of non- or late-detection of defects
especially lurks in situations of unclarity about test
coordination. Test coordination includes the action of
distributing test focus over the product by the various
parties involved, the assigning of test responsibilities and
processing of test results.  Even in co-located projects,
insufficient attention for test coordination and test
approach by project management often results in
problems with product quality. In virtual development
projects the effects of lacking or insufficient test
coordination seem to be aggravated, resulting in
additional causes for non- or late-detection.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored defect causes in
products developed by virtual teams. Because of the
practical difficulties of obtaining hard project-specific
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7defect data, an approach was taken that relied upon
accumulated expert knowledge. This approach was
found to be a practical alternative to an in-depth defect
causal analysis on a per-project basis.
In causal analysis-like meetings, experts identified
causes for defect injection and non- or late detection of
defects, considering the individual phases in a hierarchy
of related projects constituting a virtual project. Causes
were assigned to risk categories Communication,
Process, Organization and Technology.
Causes for defect injection were primarily found at
the Technical Requirements Specification  phases around
the transitions from one project to another, early in the
lifecycle. Causes for non- or late detection of defects
were primarily found at the Integration Test phases
situated at the transitions from one project to another,
late in the lifecycle.
A main limitation of this study is the relatively small
number of participating experts. Furthermore, the results
depend on expert judgement, assuming that people can
retrieve information reliably from long term memory,
and that the influence of negative group effects is
negligible. However, we don't have indications that these
limitations invalidate the results.
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8Appendix 1: Identification of causes for defect injection
Project* Injection at Communication Process Organization Technology
X Customer Requirements
Specification
X System Technical
Requirements
Change control
authority over-
concentrated in one
project. Impact analysis
of changes on other
projects difficult.
X System Architectural
Design
No involvement of
stakeholders of related
projects when creating
design
No general agreement
on error handling made
Y Technical Requirements
Specification
People have different
interpretation of
implicit requirements
Unjust trust in expertise
of other project’s staff
(e.g. have the experts do
the work, despite
missing specs and trust
on their expertise)
Expert sheltering (don’t
tell us how to do it, we
are the experts)
Lack of trust in other
projects, resulting in
information hiding
implicit assumptions
not communicated to
other projects
changes in requirements
not communicated to
related projects
unclear responsibilities
between projects for the
implementation of
requirements
Bad traceability of
requirements over
projects
Interaction between
product parts not clear
(different assumptions
made)
Organizational structure
delays communication
of changes in
requirements to related
projects
No change control
authority installed
No support for
reviewing in distributed
projects
Y High-level Design Higher-level (system)
design decisions not
communicated to
related projects
Higher-level (system)
design decisions not
clear
Interaction between
product parts not clear
(different assumptions
made)
Y Implementation Improper base-lining
over projects
Usage of different
implementation
standards by other
projects
Conventions used by
other projects are
unclear (e.g. error code
ranges)
Incorrect interpretation
of test code by other
projects
No instant access to
other projects
implementation
information (e.g. code,
documentation)
X Integration Test Additional defects as
side-effects of
workarounds needed to
bypass integration
problems
Additional defects as
side-effects of hasty
fixes by integration
team because actual
Additional defects as
side-effects of duplicate
solving of problems by
multiple projects
(unclear responsibilities
for problem solving)
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9problem solvers from
projects are not
available at time and
location of integration
- Operational
Documentation
(e.g. service manual,
operating manual,
installation manual, user
manual)
No contact possible
between development
and operations: difficult
to compile user
documentation.
Incorrect reuse of parts
of existing
documentation.
Input from other
projects (e.g.
development
documentation) is
unclear
Coverage of user
documentation for the
end product is poor, due
to each project defining
its documentation in
isolation
Responsibility for
integral user
documentation not
defined
Insufficient knowledge
(domain, product) to
create documentation
No environment
available assisting in
compiling user
documentation.
* Refers  to the generic lifecycle given in Figure 2.
Appendix 2: Identification of causes for non-detection or late-detection of defects
Project* Non-detection at Communication Process Organization Technology
X Customer Requirements
Specification
X System Technical
Requirements
X System Architectural
Design
Y Technical
Requirements
Specification
Overall review strategy
not established
No stakeholder
involvement of related
projects in review of
specifications
Reviewers not trained in
reviewing of document
hierarchies
Y Unit Test Stubs and drivers to
simulate other units
based on incorrect
assumptions
Y System Test Incorrect assumption
that certain aspects will
be tested by other
project
Relevant stakeholders
of other projects not
involved in reviewing
of test specifications
X Integration Test Unreported problems by
other projects prevent
adequate integration
testing. (delay->forced
skipping of tests)
Deliberate deviations
from agreed integration
approach not
communicated to other
projects.
Hidden test features in
objects not
communicated by other
projects. Features not
used.
Problem solvers not
present at time and
location of integration.
Incorrect assumptions
regarding integration
plan (delay->forced
skipping of tests)
Integration approach
not defined resulting in
delay or order of
delivery conflicts.
Forced skipping of tests
Objects to be integrated
not available at planned
time. (delay->forced
skipping of tests)
Stakeholders of other
projects not involved in
reviewing of test
specifications
Responsibility for
integration testing not
explicitly defined.
Previously informal
resolution of problems
in objects to be
integrated (direct
contact between
developers in different
projects)
Unclear who is
responsible for solving
problem encountered.
Duplicate solving by
various projects-
>additional defects
(delay->forced skipping
of tests)
Concealed shutting
down of functionality
by other projects’
objects, unknown to
integration tester.
Undocumented
(incomplete) self tests
by other projects’
objects.
Concealed simulators in
objects delivered by
other projects,
generating output data
incorrectly assumed to
be all right.
Behavior of simulators
created by others
projects unknown or
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Causes delays-
>skipping tests.
Solving undocumented
last-minute changes in
test objects interface
(delay->forced skipping
of tests)
Overemphasis of
testing. Testing only
those objects
experienced as
problematic by the
integrator at the cost of
other objects.
Too much focus on
‘positive testing’ after
severe integration
problems. Negative
scenarios not executed.
No coupling of earlier
review results to
integration test strategy
(inadequate testing)
Change control
authority over-
concentrated in one
project. Impact analysis
of changes on other
projects difficult.
misinterpreted.
No general agreement
by all projects on design
for testability
No infrastructure
present for integration
Integration platform not
defined/unclear (delay-
>forced skipping of
tests)
Test software not
available or unclear.
Other integration
platform used.
X System Test Unjust trust in detection
effectiveness of other
project’s staff
Difficulties in
understanding test
results produced when
testing objects created
in other projects
Not-repaired defects not
communicated by other
projects. Test results
and test object behavior
unjustly assumed to be
correct.
Blind spots in test
coverage. No agreement
on test approach is
made with other
projects.
Stakeholders of other
projects not involved in
reviewing of test
specifications.
Missing cross-
verification of solved
defects by other projects
Inadequate/no
regression testing by
other projects while no
regression test done
here.
Unjustified reuse of
other projects’ test
specifications. Specs
inadequate.
Residual test code
incorrectly assumed as
real code by other
projects.
Responsibility for final
system testing not
explicitly defined.
Testers not having a
product focus. Difficult
to create adequate test
specifications for
system parts they are
unfamiliar with.
Automated tests not
clear/undocumented
Test automation tool
used in other projects
not available
No adequate test
environment available
for objects produced by
other projects (e.g. too
expensive)
Differences in test
environments between
projects (e.g. in
environmental
conditions like
humidity, temparature)
Test conditions of other
projects unclear. No
regression testing
possible.
No possibility to
remotely monitor tests
done in other projects
Test input data used by
other projects is
unclear/unavailable.
X Acceptance Test Local differences in
usage of product.
Functionality by
infrequent scenarios not
covered.
Wrong stakeholders
involved in execution of
acceptance test
* Refers  to the generic lifecycle given in Figure 2.
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